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Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions - The Need
for Supreme Court Ordered National
Uniformity
Joel Slawotsky"
Nearly a quarter century has elapsed since the Supreme Court
last addressed in a significant fashion discovery sanctions under
Rule 371 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 In the ensuing
years, the federal district and appellate courts3 have been without
further guidance with respect to policies and procedures for
sanction imposition.4 However, notwithstanding the dearth of
Supreme Court opinions on discovery sanctions, it is generally

* Joel Slawotsky is an attorney with RUBINBAUM LLP in New York. The
author is a former law clerk to the Honorable Charles H. Tenney, United States
District Judge for the Southern District of New York.
1. Subsequent to its initial adoption in 1938, Rule 37 has been amended four
times, most recently in 1993. The historical perspective of Rule 37 is provided in
detail in the official notes to the Rule and they require no further elaboration.
With respect to the 1993 amendments, the sense that discovery abuse had become
rampant led to their development. See Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System?
Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU L. REV. 199, 222 (1994).
2. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639 (1976). While the Supreme Court mentioned Rule 37 in three subsequent
opinions, Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 119 S. Ct. 1915 (1999), Insurance
Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. V. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 699 (1982),
and Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), it was in National
Hockey, 427 U.S. at 641-43, that the Court articulated the goals of Rule 37 and
provided "some guidance" to the district and circuit courts. It should be noted that
the Court did uphold the trial court's Rule 37 sanctions each of the last four times
the Court reviewed discovery sanctions. See Cunningham, 119 S. Ct. at 1922-23;
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 709; Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767-68;
National Hockey, 427 U.S. at 643.
3. While this article deals with sanctions in federal courts, the problem of
discovery abuse exists in state courts as well. See JUSTICE HELEN E. FREEDMAN,
NEW YORK OBJECTIONS § 18:60 (1999) (discussing New York cases).
4. See Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. The Estate of Andy Warhol, 194 F.3d 323
(1999).
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acknowledged that discovery abuse is alive and well.' As one court
stated:
[T]oo many attorneys have forgotten the exhortations of these
century-old canons. Too many attorneys... have allowed the
objectives of their client to override their ancient duties as
officers of the court. In short, they have sold to the client.
We must return to the original principle that, as officers of the
court, attorneys are servants of the law rather than servants of
the highest bidder. We must rediscover the old values of 6our
profession. The integrity of our justice system depends on it.
Apparently, there are counsel who sacrifice ethical duties to
become zealots pursuing the "higher" goal of "whatever it takes"
advocacy to advance their client's position While those counsel
can rationalize such conduct by reference to the ethical codes which
frown only upon "illegal" activity,8 the conduct is wrong.
Undoubtedly, economic considerations play a significant role in
5. The large number of trial and appellate court rulings with respect to
discovery sanctions speaks volumes. Discovery misconduct has also been the
subject of numerous articles. See, e.g., Stephen R. Bough, Spitting in a Judge's
Face: The 8th Circuit's Treatment of Rule 37 Dismissal and Default Discovery
Sanctions, 43 S.D. L. REV. 36 (1998); Byron C. Kelling, A Prescriptionfor Healing
the Crisis in Professionalism:Shift the Burden of Enforcing ProfessionalStandards
of Conduct, 25 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 31 (1993); Carol W. Hunstein, The Decline of
Professionalism, 29 GA. ST. BAR J. 111 (1992); Kathy Bidegaray Irigoin, Rule 37
Sanctions: Deterrence to Discovery Abuses, 46 MONT. L. REV. 95 (1985). In a
noteworthy concurrence in Cunningham, Justice Kennedy observed, "[c]ases
involving sanctions against attorneys all too often implicate allegations that, when
true, bring the law into great disrepute. Delays and abuses in discovery are the
source of widespread injustice ....
Cunningham, 119 S. Ct. at 1923.
6. Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir. 1993).
7. See Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 70 F. Supp.2d 415, 442 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) ("Although an attorney must represent his client zealously, he cannot be a
'zealot.' ").
8. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1980)
("The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same:
to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.").
Note the trend is toward a stricter approach to ethical standards. Under Rule
3.3(a)(3) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1999 ed.) ("Model Rules")
there is no similar provision. Under the Model Rule a lawyer must advise the
court of "controlling legal authority on the subject jurisdictions." Compare with
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-20 which states disclosure of
adverse authority is merely "aspirational." Also see Model Rule 3.4(e), which
states "[a] lawyer shall not.., make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an
opposing party." There is no analogous provision in the Model Code except DR7102(A)(1) and (2) which prohibit conduct designed to "harass or maliciously injure
another" or that are "unwarranted under existing law."
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obscuring the lines of proper conduct. Moreover, attorneys are
reflecting the demands of their clients, too many of whom are
themselves willing to testify in a less than perfectly honest manner. 9
Although there are varying positions with respect to sanction
imposition, sanctions are generally accepted as necessary 0 and
appeal to an equitable chord in most attorneys, namely, that parties
should not reap benefits from their misconduct."
This article will provide an overview and analysis of how the
federal courts have invoked discovery sanctions (with an emphasis
on recent "post-1993 Amendment rulings") 2 as well as a
comparison of various jurisdictions with regard to litigation
terminating sanctions. Given the lack of Supreme Court ordered
objective criteria, federal district courts have struggled to balance
the need to punish and deter discovery misconduct and the need to
manage their dockets with the parties' right to "their day in court."
As a result, a series of various approaches has arisen depending
upon the jurisdiction 3 and even within a given jurisdiction.14 The
article suggests that to promote the laudable objectives of sanctions,
the Supreme Court should articulate objective criteria for sanction
imposition so as to achieve national uniformity.

9. See, e.g., Matthew T. Lifflander, Liars Go Free in the Courtroom, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb 24, 1997, at 2 ("Many Americans are concerned about the decline of morality.
It is a big issue.... Those who are willing to discuss reality would certainly be able
to relate extensive experiences with false testimony by both plaintiffs and
defendants in civil cases."). Once again note an interesting comparison between
the Model Rule and the Model Code. Compare the language of Model Rule
3.3(b), prohibiting the presentation of evidence "[a] lawyer reasonably believes is
fake" (emphasis added), with Model Code DR7-105(C)(b) which forbids counsel
from presenting evidence the lawyer "knows" to be fake.
10. Many courts are imposing meaningful sanctions. See Richard F. Ziegler,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 7, 2000, at A16 ("The price paid by litigators who cross the line
from uncivil but 'zealous' advocacy to sanctionable misconduct has gotten much,
much steeper.").
11. See Mischalski v. Ford Motor Co., 935 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
("[there is a] widely recognized principle that a person should not be permitted to
take advantage of his or her own wrongdoing by predicating a legal or equitable
claim on the person's own fraudulent, immoral or illegal conduct.").
12. Most cited cases herein are "post-Amendment" rulings. However, there
are also "pre-Amendment" rulings.
13. See infra notes 187-232 and accompanying text.
14. See Ziegler, supra note 10, at A16. "The courtroom is marked by a variety
of boundaries that delineate sanctionable misconduct, but only some of them are
bright lines." See Bough, supra note 5, at 49 ("The [Eighth Circuit] Court of
Appeals subjects dismissals to a much different standard of review than the
standard applied in defaults .... ").
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Introduction

Rule 37 discovery sanctions are intertwined with Rules
26(a)(1) through (3),15 most recently amended in 1993.16 Under
Rule 37, a party that fails to disclose or supplement responses
mandated by Rule 26(a) and (e)(1) risks the preclusion of that
nondisclosed information 17 unless that information is harmless 8 and
moreover, can be subject to a wide variety of sanctions.19
Specifically, where a party has willfully withheld highly relevant and
adverse material from discovery despite specifically tailored and
repeated requests for such material, sanctions are appropriate.2 °
Courts have noted that in complex lawsuits they are less willing
to forgive discovery violations.2 Potential recipients of sanctions22
range from counsel,23 law firms,24 government attorneys,25 pro se

15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)-(3) (as amended effective December 1, 1993).
16. Even if a case was commenced prior to the effective date of the 1993
amendments, if substantial discovery is conducted subsequent to the amendment
the parties will be subject to the amendments. See In re TMI Litigation Cases
Consol. II, 922 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
17. Under Rule 26(g) sanctions can also be implemented but solely for Rule
26(a)(1) or (3) violations not for violations under section (a)(2).
18. Although Rule 37 does not articulate the types of nondisclosure that are
harmless, the advisory notes to the 1993 amendments provide some guidance. The
following is suggested as harmless: "inadvertent omission from a Rule 26(a)(1)(A)
disclosure of the name of a potential witness known to all parties; the failure to list
as a trial witness a person so listed by another party; or the lack of knowledge of a
pro se litigant of the requirement to make disclosures." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)
(1993 advisory notes).
19. A district court has substantial discretion in determining sanctions for
discovery misconduct. See Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau Intern., Inc., 165 F.R.D.
398 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 111 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1997); Miltope Corp. v. Hartford
Cas. Ins. Co., 163 F.R.D. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
20. See Arthur v. Atkinson Freight Lines Corp., 164 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
21. See, e.g., In re TMI Litigation Cases Consol. II, 922 F. Supp. 997, 1005
(M.D. Pa. 1996) ("Were the instant action a less complex lawsuit, the court would
be more inclined to find Plaintiffs' Rule 26 violations harmless."); In re Ford
Motor Co. Bronco II Products Liability Litig., No. Civ. A. MDL 991, 1996 WL
28517 (E.D. La. January 23 1996) ("[c]ompliance with the disclosure requirements
is particularly important in complex cases"); United States v. Davis, No. CA900484P, 1993 WL 525591 at *1 (D. R.I. April 16, 1993) ("At trial in this case, expert
witnesses are expected to testify about complex scientific and technical issues. ...
[t]o adequately prepare for trial, each side must have detailed, final information
regarding the opposing expert witnesses' testimony, and the theories and
documents upon which the expert witness will rely.").
22. Note that a nonparty may be sanctioned only under Rule 37(b)(1) or
pursuant to a court's inherent power. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of America v.
Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc., 126 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1997) (sanction against
nonparty improper as sanction available only against parties).
23. Fonar Corp. v. Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc., 128 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997)
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litigants26 and parties themselves. 1
Belated production of documents does not preclude imposition
Neither does
of sanctions for earlier failures to produce. 2'
In addition, should a
inadequate production preclude sanctions.
party move for sanctions in bad faith, the movant may be subject to
sanctions. °

A prerequisite for sanction imposition is that the information

be not otherwise readily available.3'

Sanctions are levied not

(sanctions and contempt finding imposed upon counsel for failure to produce
witness for deposition and failure to explain noncompliance). There is no
exception for in-house counsel, although if they are not counsel in the case they
must be served with notice of the sanctions motion as opposed to merely serving
counsel in the litigation. See McGuire v. Sigma Coatings, Inc., 48 F.3d 902, 907-908
(5th Cir. 1995) (district court improperly assessed sanctions on in-house counsel
for destruction of documents). The court noted that in-house counsel had not
been served with process that sanctions were being considered and was not counsel
in the case. See id. at 907. Although counsel had participated in the litigation this
was insufficient to overcome the lack of notice. See id. Moreover, counsel's
motion to vacant the sanctions did not constitute a "voluntary appearance." Id. at
908.
24. See BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 12 F.3d 1045
(11th Cir. 1994) (sanctions imposed upon law firm for failing to search files for
documents). But see Doblar v. Unverforth Mfg. Co., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 258 (D.S.D.
1999) (holding that sanctions against a law firm were not warranted even though
there was a failure to disclose an expert's previous appearances in over 200 other
cases). The firm had relied upon the expert's representations that disclosure was
complete and made some effort at corroborating same. See id.
25. See In re Williams, 188 B.R. 721 (Bankr. R. I.) affd in part, vacated in part,
215 B.R. 289 (D. R.I. 1995) (stating that government attorneys can be personally
sanctioned for failing to comply with discovery orders).
26. See Oklahoma Federated Gold and Numismatics, Inc. v. Blodgett, 24 F.3d
136 (10th Cir. 1994) (sanctions against pro se litigant appropriate for failure to
respond to interrogatories, produce documents, or make himself available for
deposition).
27. See Wardrip v. Hart, 949 F. Supp. 801 (D. Kan. 1996) (sanction imposed
against defendant, not counsel, because failure to produce documents was outside
counsel's control and counsel warned client of possible sanctions for noncompliance).
28. See Lee v. Walters, 172 F.R.D. 421 (D. Or. 1997) (belated production of
documents does not preclude imposition of sanctions for earlier failures to appear
or produce).
29. See In re Independent Service Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 168 F.R.D. 651 (D.
Kan. 1996).
30. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D. 510, 511-12 (M.D. Ga.
1993). Plaintiff's counsel canceled depositions because of his father's illness. See
id. at 511. Defendant sought sanctions for the cancellation. See id. The court
refused to sanction plaintiff but rather imposed them on the defense. See id. at
512. The court stated "[ilt.appears that the only reason these sanctions are sought
is because the [defendants] requested that their counsel do so." Id. at 511.
31. See Higgins v. Correctional Medical Services of Ill., Inc., 178 F.3d 508 (7th
Cir. 1999) (sanctions inappropriate when nondisclosed witness names were
contained in medical records consisting of only eight pages).
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merely for withholding information32 but can be assessed for
obstructing discovery33 or a failure to obey discovery3 4 or pre-trial

orders.
While a motion for sanctions need not be made
immediately subsequent to a failure to meet a deadline, it must to
be made within a reasonable time;36 otherwise it may be denied as
untimely. Furthermore, in general courts look with disfavor upon
parties who move to compel without attempting to first amicably
resolve the dispute.38

Indeed, Rule 37 mandates that prior to

moving, the movant must certify that a good faith attempt has been
made to resolve the dispute.39

Although sanctions are not to be easily granted given their
potential for ending litigation ° and courts should act with restraint
in imposing severe sanctions,4 when appropriate, courts have
imposed sanctions of post-judgement.42 Even in the absence of
jurisdiction, sanctions may be imposed. 3 A court may sanction a

party, an act with claim preclusive consequences, even in the
absence of jurisdiction because the lack of jurisdiction prevents
solely litigation of the claim on the merits.'
32. See Boardman v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 106 F.3d 840, 842 (8th
Cir. 1997).
33. See Fonar Corp. v. Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc., 128 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.
1997) (failure to produce witness for deposition warranted sanctions against
counsel); Intercept Sec. Corp. v. Code-Alarm, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 318 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (defendant forced plaintiff to file a motion to compel).
34. See Mann v. Lewis, 108 F.3d 145,146 (8th Cir. 1997).
35. See Neufeld v. Neufeld, 172 F.R.D. 115, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
36. See Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp.2d 879, 886 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (two-month delay between discovery's close and a motion for sanctions was
not an "unreasonable delay" as would render the motion untimely).
37. See Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155-56 (7th Cir.
1998) (upholding failure to impose sanctions based upon spoilation of
documentary evidence given delay in moving for sanctions); Brandt v. Vulcan,
Inc., 30 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 1994) (deeming sanctions motion untimely where
party was aware of discovery abuse long before trial).
38. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Serafino, 168 F.R.D. 99 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding that
the defendant had failed to comply with both federal and local rules regarding
consultation with opposing counsel on discovery dispute).
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B).
40. Cf. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991).
41. See id.
42. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp.2d 1118, 1125 n.12 (E.D. Ark. 1999) ("A
court may make an adjudication of contempt and impose a contempt sanction even
after the action in which the contempt arose has been terminated.") (internal
quotations omitted); see also Heinrichs v. Marshall and Stevens, Inc., 921 F.2d 418,
421 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Merritt v. Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d
1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 1981)).
43. See In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 431 (9th Circuit 1996) (sanctions
upheld despite the fact removal was improper and the court lacked jurisdiction).
44. See Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Associates, 116 F.3d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir.
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Inherent Power

Federal district courts possess broad inherent powers to punish
discovery misconduct through the imposition of sanctions.45 This
power to sanction for abusive discovery practices stems from the
courts' inherent power.' Accordingly, since this power is based in
part on its inherent power, courts are not bound by the stricture of
the statute but rather can be flexible to achieve a just result.
Courts have this power even when the offensive conduct lies
outside the formal boundaries of Rule 37.' This power is supported
by the rationale that courts must be able to maintain respect.49 The

power of the district court is limited by the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause 0 which has been held to merely afford the party an

opportunity to provide the reasons for discovery misconduct.5

1997) (finding that dismissal could be, but was not, upheld for failing to attend
conferences despite the lack of subject matter jurisdiction), vacated, remanded, 182
F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d at 431 (dismissal sanction
collateral to merits).
45. See, e.g., Winn v. Associated Press, 903 F. Supp. 575, 581 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
104 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that power to sanction ensures proper
administration of justice); White v. Office of the Public Defender for the State of
Md., 170 F.R.D. 138, 149 (D. Md. 1997) (stating that courts' inherent power to
sanction allows courts to respond to discovery abuse in situations where the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply); In re Tutu Water Wells
Contamination Litig., 166 F.R.D. 331, 339 (D.V.I.) affd in part, vacated in part, 120
F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that courts' inherent power to sanction for
discovery misconduct can be relied upon in the sanctioning of a party whose
conduct was not explicitly covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
46. See, e.g., Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp.2d 950, 954 (D. Minn. 1999);
Doblar v. Unverferth Mfg. Co., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 258,260 (D. S.D. 1999)
47. See, e.g., Williams v. National Housing Exchange Inc., 165 F.R.D. 405, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (defendants precluded from obtaining discovery until they
provide discovery); National Communications Ass'n, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., No. CIV. 1735, 1998 WL 118174, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1998) (plaintiffs
permitted to offer hearsay evidence at trial because of defendant's failure to
provide discovery).
48. See, e.g., Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp.2d 879, 887-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (conduct falling outside the express terms of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure can be sanctioned by inherent power of the court).
49. See, e.g., In re TMI, 922 F. Supp. 997, 1007-08 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 1996)
"Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence,
and submission to their lawful mandates. These powers are governed not by rule
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Id.
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)), affd, 89 F.3d 1106 (3d
1996)).
et
50. See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
51. See Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 186 F.3d 1016, 1023 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Due
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III. Necessity of Order
Absent an order compelling discovery52 and a failure to comply
with such an order, sanctions are generally inappropriate.53 Thus,
the absence of an order precludes sanctions.54 Therefore, if no
motion to compel discovery is made, a party may be unable to raise
noncompliance.55 In U.S. v. Certain Real Property Located at Route
1, Bryant, Ala.,56 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district court
had abused its discretion when it denied a motion to vacate default
judgements.57 The court found that the imposition of sanctions
without an order compelling discovery was improper. 8
However, under Rule 26(g), sanctions may be imposed
regardless of the existence of an order since the rule does not
require a violation of an order. In addition, Rule 37(c)(1) provides
that where a party fails to disclose pursuant to Rule 26(a) or (e)(1),
that party is precluded from using the evidence either at a hearing,
motion, or trial. The adversely effected party need not move for
preclusion; the sanction is self-executing. Thus, the deprived party
need simply object to the use of the nondisclosed information. In
addition, the near universal requirement of a Pre-trial Order, with
various discovery obligations contained therein, will serve as an
order.
IV. Substantial Justification/Harmless Failure
However, not all failures to comply with a discovery order is
tantamount to misconduct. Should a court find that a party had
substantial justification for failing to disclose or, alternatively, find
the failure is harmless, sanctions may be lessened or eliminated. 9
For example, in Taydus v. Cisneros,6° the court did not impose the
full sanction of preclusion but imposed monetary sanctions citing
Process is satisfied if the sanctioned party has a real and full opportunity to explain
its questionable conduct before sanctions are imposed.").
52. The motion to compel discovery needs to be made contemporaneously
with the failure to disclose. Cf.U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Baker Material
Handling Corp., 62 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1995).
53. See U. S. v. Certain Real Property Located at Route 1, Bryant, Alabama,
126 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1997) (questioning sanctions absent court order).
54. See Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., 30 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1994).
55. See Jarvis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 337, 338 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
56. 126 F.3d at 1318.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See International Business Machines Corp. v. Fasco Industries, Inc., No. C93-20326, 1995 WL 115421, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 15, 1995).
60. 902 F. Supp. 288, 297 (D. Mass. 1995).
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"the lack of magnitude of the violation." 61 Various factors can

result in a "substantial justification" for failure to disclose or

"harmless failure" to disclose, such as the existence of good faith,62
66
65
time to correct, whether
willfulness, 63 surprise,' prejudice,
disclosure is already in the opponent's possession,67 and waiver.'

Courts have also been known to extend "last chances" prior to
imposing sanctions.69 However, sloppy record keeping by an expert
witness 7° or counsel or internal scheduling problems71 are not

considered "substantial justification."
V.

The Scope of Discovery Sanctions
Discovery abuse may lead to the ultimate sanctions: dismissal

or default. Other severe sanctions may result in: (1) preclusion of a
defense; 72 (2) dismissal of counterclaims;73 (3) inability to use75
evidence in motion practice;

(4) inability to use exhibits at trial;

61. Id. at n.10.
62. See Woodworker's Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d
985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[t]he following factors should guide [the district court's]
discretion [in evaluating whether nondisclosure is substantially justified or
harmless error occurred]; 1) the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom
the testimony is offered; 2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; 3) the
extent to which introducing such testimony would disrupt the trial; and 4) the
moving party's bad faith or willfulness.) (citation omitted)).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.; see also Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. UWATEC USA, Inc., 102 F.3d
1224 (1996).
66. See Lentz v. Mason, 32 F. Supp.2d 733 (D.N.J. 1999).
67. See Higgins v. Correctional Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 178 F.3d 508 (7th Cir.
1999).
68. See U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 62 F.3d
24 (1st Cir. 1995).
69. See Elbex Video Kabushiki Kaisha v. Taiwan Regular Electronics Co.,
Ltd., No. 93 CIV. 6160 (KMW), 1996 WL 87278, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 25, 1996)
("[B]ecause entry of default is a serious sanction, the court gives defendants one
last chance to avoid it.").
70. See Doblar v. Unverferth Mfg. Co. Inc., 185 F.R.D. 258 (D. S.D. 1999).
71. See Lee v. Walters, 172 F.R.D. 421, 428 (D. Or. 1997) (noting that
"scheduling difficulties" are not a valid excuse for failure to comply with discovery
order particularly when counsel never so advised the court that schedule prevented
compliance and ignored inquiries from opposing counsel).
72. See Callwood v. Zurita, 158 F.R.D. 359 (D. V.I. 1994).
73. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
74. See China Resource Products (USA) Ltd. v. Fayda Intern., Inc., 856 F.
Supp. 856, 866-67 (D. Del. 1994).
75. See Bishop v. General Motors Corp., No. Civ. 94-286-B, 1995 WL 886841
(E.D. Okla. Sept. 6, 1995).
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(5) establishment of a party's prima facie case;76 (6) forfeiture;77 or
(7) a jury instruction that a party's failure to disclose can lead to the
assumption that evidence would be unfavorable to that party. 8
On the other hand, sanctions may take the form of less drastic
measures such as continuances and stays,79 contempt citations and
monetary fines, 8° awards of attorneys' fees , or court expense
reimbursement.' Nor are sanctions by necessity one-sided, they
can be imposed simultaneously on both sides. 3 In addition,
bankruptcy cases are not excluded from the imposition of sanctions
for discovery abuses.'
VI. The Purpose of Sanctions
The purpose of sanctions is similar to the rationale underpinning punitive damages - to punish and deter. 8 As one court
stated, "[s]anctions must be imposed, not only to redress the
misconduct.., but to deter others who.., might themselves
consider emulating the President... by willfully violating discovery

76. See Chilcutt v. U.S., 4 F.3d 1313 (5th Cir. 1993); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
103 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 1996) (unexplained failure to appear at deposition
warranted sanction of deeming allegations of contempt motions to be established).
77. See U.S. v. U.S. Currency in Amount of Twenty-Four Thousand One
Hundred Seventy Dollars ($24,170.00) more or less, 147 F.R.D. 18 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
78. See Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1999); Weeks v. ARA
Services, 869 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
79. See U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 62
F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1994).
80. See Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 62 F.3d 1469
(D.C. App. 1995) (courts can impose fines and contempt citations as necessary to
punish litigation misconduct); Yang v. Brown University, 149 F.R.D. 440 (D. R.I.
1993) (failure to provide complete answer to expert interrogatory warrants a fine
against counsel).
81. See Gallant v. Telebrands, 35 F. Supp.2d 378 (D. N.J. 1998).
82. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (ordering
President Clinton to pay $1202 to reimburse the court's travel expenses).
83. See Jaen v. Coca-Cola Co., 157 F.R.D. 146 (D. P.R. 1994) (both sides
ordered to pay fines since both were responsible for needless discovery motions;
sanctions payable to court).
84. See generally, In re Hutter, 207 B.R. 981 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding that
failure to follow court order constituted an abuse of discovery process warranting
sanctions).
85. As detailed infra, many jurisdictions cite to various factors as providing the
rationale for sanction imposition. Prior to the seminal decision in National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam),
deterrence was not a goal of sanctions. However, in National Hockey, the
Supreme Court articulated deterrence of discovery misconduct as a goal of
sanctions. See id. at 643.
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orders of this and other courts, thereby engaging in conduct that
undermines the integrity of the judicial system. '

Sanctions for discovery abuse are aimed both at preventing
prejudice to parties and insuring the integrity of the discovery
process.'

For example, in Doblar v. Unverferth Mfg. Co. Inc.,88 the

court held that a plaintiff's expert witness's failure to disclose his
prior appearance in over 200 other cases was a violation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus sanctionable.89 The court

so found despite the fact that the jury found in favor of the
defendant. 90 The court held the nondisclosure damaged the
"integrity of the court system" and thus should be punished."
VII. Discretion
The decision to impose sanctions and the level of sanctions

rests with the discretion of the trial court.? A sanction must be
appropriate and "specifically related to the particular 'claim,' which
was at issue in the order to provide discovery. ' Sanction rulings

are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and how the ruling is
characterized (factual or legal) can lead to varying results. "If the
information sought is a question of [ ] law, [ ] the district court's
conclusions of [ ] law are reviewed de novo as questions of law." 94

District courts are afforded a great deal of discretion in determining
whether dismissal is warranted and appellate courts will normally
affirm these rulings absent an abuse of discretion.95

86. Jones, 36 F. Supp.2d at 1131; see also Gallant v. Telebrands Corp., 35 F.
Supp.2d 378, 404 ("Rule 37 sanctions must be applied diligently 'both to penalize
those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, [and] to deter
those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.' ")
(citations omitted).
87. See Gratton v. Great American Communications, 178 F.3d 1373 (11th Cir.
1999) ("Rule 37 sanctions are intended to prevent unfair prejudice to the litigants
and insure the integrity of the discovery process.").
88. 185 F.R.D. 258 (D.S.D. 1999).
89. See id. at 260.
90. See id. at 258.
91. Id. at 262.
92. See Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 777 (10th Cir. 1999);
Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1995).
93. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc., 126 F.3d 215, 220
(3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
94. Cacique, Inc. v. Robert Beiser & Co., Inc., 169 F.3d 619, 622 (9th Cir.
1999).
95. "An abuse of discretion occurs when this court has 'a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.' " Miller v.
Lorain County Bd. of Elections, 141 F.3d 252, 259 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Logan
v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir. 1989)).
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A district court reviewing a magistrate's ruling96 on a sanctions
motion can apply either the "clearly erroneous" or "contrary to
law" standard.9

The clearly erroneous standard applies to factual

findings including sanction orders, meaning that a court will disturb
the order "only if the district court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." 98 The contrary to law
standard provides for de novo review of legal determinations."

Therefore, the level of scrutiny by a district court in reviewing a
magistrate's order will depend on whether the magistrate relied

upon factual findings or legal conclusions."
Discretion is generally quite broad and appellate courts are
reluctant to interfere with trial court decisions. 1 The rationale is
that "the trial court is obviously in a much better position to assess
the need for sanctions than a panel of [the appellate] court."'0 2
Discretion is abused only when a ruling constitutes an "arbitrary,

capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment."'0 3
However, at least one court has held that "[e]nforcing a discovery
request for irrelevant information is a per se abuse of discretion."''

In addition, courts have held that an abuse of discretion arises
when expert testimony is precluded because of a failure to comply
with discovery if the preclusion will result in a dismissal of the case,

unless the court affords notice to the party and considers less
stringent sanctions.0 Rulings that constitute either an abuse of
discretion or error of law will be vacated.' °6 Appellate courts will
96. Pursuant to Rule 72(a), a party has ten days after service of the order to
object to a nondispositive order.
97. The standard of review is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1994).
See Computer Economics, Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp.2d 980 (S.D.
Cal. 1999).
98. Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Industries, Co. Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir.
1997).
99. See 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3069 (2d ed. 1997).
100. See, e.g., Computer Economics, 50 F. Supp.2d at 980 ("the magistrate
judge's order reveals that the sanctions order was based solely on a determination
that is a rule of procedure inapplicable in federal court.").
101. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
522 U.S. 222 (1998), vacated in part, 138 F.3d 1225 (8th Cir. 1998); Shepherd v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. App. 1995) (courts
have inherent power to punish misconduct which guards judicial fairness).
102. Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 777 (10th Cir. 1999).
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Cacique, Inc. v. Robert Reiser & Co., Inc., 169 F.3d 619, 622 (9th Cir.
1999).
105. See Mooney v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 184 F.R.D. 588 (N.D. Ohio
1999).
106. See id.
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also reverse sanctions if they are disproportionate to the violation.
In Bel v. Lakewood Engineeringand Mfg. Co.,7°7 the Sixth Circuit
reversed an order of dismissal holding that since no inspection
notice had been served and the items were destroyed prior to the
lawsuit dismissal constituted an abuse of discretion. ' °8 Generally,
abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is based "on an
erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of
the evidence."'"
Dismissal has also been reversed where there
exists an absence of a pattern of discovery misconduct."
Practically, courts have endeavored to find a sanction "that fits
the crime." In essence, courts choose a sanction that is tailored to
the discovery violation, after an evaluation of the prejudice and the
degree of fault."' Thus, in Baker v. General Motors Corp.,' 2 the
Eight Circuit found that the sanction of striking a manufacturer's
defenses was disproportionate to the discovery violation." 3 The
manufacturer had failed to comply with an order requiring
production of customer complaints involving similar accidents."'
The appellate court found that while there was a violation, the
sanction failed to strike a balance between the interest of punishing
violators and hearing a case on the merits."5 The court held that
striking the defenses effectively deprived the manufacturer of its
day in court."6
In Satcorp Intern. Group v. China National Silk Import &
Export Corp.,"' the district court had imposed a $10,000 sanction on
counsel because of the withholding of documents."" The Second
Circuit reversed, ruling that the district court's failure to inform
counsel that sanctions may be imposed constituted an abuse of
discretion."9 Although the lack of due process in imposing the
107. 15 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1994).
108. See id. at 547.
109. Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers' Intern. Union of North America, 177
F.3d 394, 413 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
110. See Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding
violation of order not willful and discovery cut-off date unclear).
111. See Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp.2d 879 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
112. 86 F.3d 811, rev'd, remanded, 522 U.S. 222 (1998), vacated in part, 138 F.3d
1225 (8th Cir. 1998).
113. See id. at 817.
114. See id. at 814.
115. See id. at 817.
116. See id.
117. 101 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 1996).
118. See id. at 5.
119. See id. (stating that "the Constitution requires the provision of procedural
protection before a non-compensatory, punitive fine can be demanded from the
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punitive fine was the principle reason for the decision, the court
also criticized the district court's failure to articulate the grounds
for the fine stating such a finding is in effect an abuse of
discretion.'2"
VIII. The Types of Sanctions
A. Exclusion - Generally

The failure to provide discovery blocks a party's ability to
prosecute or defend claims. As a result, a sanction for frustrating
discovery can be exclusion of evidence or a finding that certain
issues are decided against the recalcitrant party.' A district court
may sanction a party by precluding it from supporting or opposing
claims and defenses.122 While exclusion is a harsh sanction,'23 it may
be imposed even for grossly negligent conduct.'
Most courts
however, exclude evidence only when the failure to disclose is done
in bad faith or results in incurable prejudice.'25 The sanction of
exclusion has been imposed under a variety of circumstances

including the following: where a party fails to identify a witness,'
fails to produce documents pursuant to a document request and
subsequently ask a witness questions about the documents,"'21
engages in misconduct that was willful and tactically motivated,'

party or from an attorney.").
120. "The district court did not make clear the legal basis pursuant to which it
acted in imposing the fine. It simply ordered the sanction without reference to any
statute, rule, decision or authority. This by itself might well be sufficient to
warrant a remand." Id.
121. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982) (finding defense preclusion appropriate sanction against
party engaging in discovery abuse).
122. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B)(d).
123. See In re Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 168 F.R.D. 651, 653 (D.
Kan. 1996) ("Exclusion of evidence is a severe sanction because it implicates due
process concerns.").
124. See New York State Nat. Org. for Women v. Cuomo, No. 93 CIV. 7146
(RLC) (JCF), 1997 WL 671610 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1997).
125. See Fitz, Inc. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 184 F.R.D. 532, 536 (D.N.J.
1996).
126. See Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 719-20 (3d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1079 (1998) (affirming preclusion when party failed
to identify witness until three weeks prior to trial).
127. See Tomlinson v. St. Paul Reinsurance Management Corp., No. 96 Civ.
4760 (JFK) (M), 1997 WL 167051 (S.D.N.Y. April 9,1997).
128. Communispond, Inc. v. Kelley, No. 96 Civ. 1487 (DC), April 9, 1999 WL
9854 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999)
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misleads the court with respect
to the existence of documents," 9 or
fails to produce a product.130
B. Expert Witness Preclusion
The failure to timely disclose an expert witness as required by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3' can lead to preclusion of the
expert.132 As with any sanction, the decision to preclude an expert
for failure to comply with the Rules is within the discretion of the

trial court.133 In any appeal of an order of expert preclusion, it is
essential to proffer the testimony that was excluded from the
record.34 Without such proffer, the party will not be able to show
that the excluded testimony was prejudicial so as to affect their

substantial rights pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2).
Preclusion of expert testimony is imposed when the court finds
the failure to comply with discovery requirements both unjustified
and prejudicial unless the failure is harmless. 36 Failure to comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to disclosure of

expert witness information is harmless only when "there is no
prejudice to the party seeking disclosure., 137 Although preclusion is
considered a drastic remedy only to be imposed where the conduct
represents flagrant bad faith 38 and the party entitled to disclosure

has been prejudiced, 139 it is routinely imposed as a punishment for
failure to make a required expert disclosure.4°

129. See id.
130. Langley v. Union Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 510, 513-514 (7th Cir. 1997) (court
properly precluded evidence as to boiler as sanction for failure to produce it).
131. This encompasses local rules and a district court's scheduling orders. See
Boardman v. National Med. Enter., 106 F.3d 840, 842-43 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming
preclusion for failure to disclose expert witness pursuant to local rule).
132. Doblar v. Unverferth Mfg. Co. Inc., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 258 (D.S.D. 1999)
(stating that courts have inherent power to sanction not only expert disclosures but
expert as well).
133. Woodworker's Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985,
993 (10th Cir. 1999); Fitz, Inc. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 184 F.R.D. 532 (D.N.J.
1999).
134. Heidtman v. County of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1040 (5th Cir. 1999).
135. See id.
136. See DiPirro v. U.S., 43 F. Supp.2d 327 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
137. Fitz, 184 F.R.D. at 539 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 540.
139. See id. (preclusion inappropriate when undisclosed information was of
marginal relevance and there was no claim of bad faith); see also Matei v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 35 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1994).
140. See Melendez v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 79 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 1996)
(affirming preclusion of expert testimony as a sanction for discovery misconduct).
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In GSGSB, Inc. v. New York Yankees, 4 ' the magistrate judge
precluded the testimony of plaintiff's expert with respect to time
sheets that were included in the expert's trial calculations but which
were never provided to the defendant.'
The time sheets were a
seriously contested discovery item. 43 The failure to produce4 4 the
time records prejudiced defendant so as to warrant preclusion.
In Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co.,
4
1
Inc., 5 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a sanction of preclusion stating
that
[Plaintiff] even appears at times to admit that it did not comply
with the discovery order by stating that it was 'impossible' to
comply and that their experts 'did all they could do' under the
circumstances. The reasons for noncompliance, however, are
relevant to the separate issue of whether the sanction imposed
was appropriate. On the other hand, a violation of an order
is a
4
violation of an order, regardless of the reasons therefor.' 1
The court added that "[w]hile a continuance would have given
[the defendant] more time to review the late disclosures, such a
measure 'would neither punish [plaintiff] for its conduct nor deter
similar behavior in the future.' ,,14
In Lentz v. Mason,4 8 the court refused to preclude testimony
referring to preclusion as an "extreme" sanction "not to be imposed49
absent willful deception or a 'flagrant disregard' of a court order.'
The basis of the sanction motion was the failure to timely disclose
the identity of the witnesses. 5 The court found that the failure to
do so did not prejudice the defendants since the witnesses were
141. No. 91 Civ. 1803 (SWK) (JCF), 1996 WL 422240 (S.D.N.Y. August 26,
1996), affd, 122 F.3d 1056 (2d Cir. 1997).
142. See id. at 20.
143. See id.
144. See id.; see also Tomlinson v. St. Paul Reinsurance Management Corp., No.
91 Civ. 4760 (JKF) (MHD), 1997 WL 167051 (S.D.N.Y. April 9, 1997) (finding
failure to produce documents warranted preclusion of deposition testimony,
although documents themselves could be used at trial).
145. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996)
146. Id. at 571 n.46 (emphasis in original).
147. Id. at 573 (citation omitted); see also In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litig.,
Nos. 87-1190, 86-2229, 87-1258, 87-3227, 1996 WL 24751, at * 2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24,
1996) (denying motion to submit supplemental expert reports ruling "the process
of producing new expert reports, deposing the new experts, producing responsive
reports from defense experts, and subjecting the new experts to in limine scrutiny
would unduly delay the final disposition of these cases.").
148. 32 F. Supp.2d 733 (D.N.J. 1999).
149. Id. at 739 (quoting Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n,
559 F.2d 884, 904-05 (3d Cir. 1977)).
150. See id. at 740.
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identified in interrogatory responses or deposition.'51 Moreover,
the court noted that the witnesses were identified in the pre-trial
order, and the defendants had an opportunity to depose the
witnesses but did not even ask for an adjournment to conduct
additional discovery. 52 The court applied a four part test to
determine whether to exclude the evidence, which includes
consideration of the following: (1) prejudice against the party the
evidence is sought to be used against; (2) the ability to cure the
prejudice; (3) the extent to which inclusion or preclusion would
disrupt the case or other cases; and (4) bad faith or willfulness of
the offending party.'53 This four part test has been embraced in
other jurisdictions as well.'
C. Dismissal
A court is empowered to enter an order dismissing the action

(or any part thereof) as a sanction for discovery misconduct.'
Dismissal is a severe sanction' 6 that courts have held should be
invoked sparingly.'57 Indeed, due process considerations mandate

that a sanction that deprives a litigant from his other day in court be
imposed only in situations involving willfulness, bad faith, or fault
(as opposed to inability to comply).5
As one court stated, an
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Lentz, 32 F. Supp.2d at 739-740.
154. See, e.g., Woodworker's Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mutual Life Ins Co., 170
F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999); Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1995).
155. See Friends of Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 131 F.3d 332, 334 (2d
Cir. 1997) (dismissal sanction upheld where record demonstrated a history of
discovery abuse and party was warned of dismissal potential); Harmon v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 366-369 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 868 (1997)
(dismissal affirmed when interrogatories not answered for one year and party
failed to respond to dismissal motion); In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 431 (9th
Cir. 1996) (dismissal appropriate as refusal to comply with court's orders lasted
two years); Carter v. Prince George's County, Md., 155 F.R.D. 128 (D. Md. 1994);
see also Elliot v. New York City Housing Authority, No. 93 Civ. 8729 (JFK), 1995
WL 384446 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 28, 1995), remanded, 100 F.3d 941 (2d Cir. 1996)
(dismissing complaint because of plaintiff's failure to name at his deposition
individuals who allegedly harassed him); Selby v. Arms, No. 93 Civ. 6481 (DLC),
1995 WL 753894, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 25, 1995) reconsiderationdenied, 1996 WL
131820 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1996) (repeated failure to comply with court orders
constituted willful conduct and reflected "disregard for the integrity of the
discovery process and indeed, the integrity of the court").
156. Default is also a severe sanction.
See infra notes 169-186 and
accompanying text.
157. See Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, New York Branch, 100 F.3d 243, 249
(2d Cir. 1996).
158. Cf Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau Intern., Inc., 165 F.R.D. 398 (S.D.N.Y.
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important consideration is to strike the balance between alleviating
court calendar congestion and protecting a party's right to due
process and a fair chance to be heard.'59 In addition, it has been
held that due process requires that the sanction "must be

specifically related to the particular 'claim' which was at issue in the
order." 60

The purpose of dismissal with prejudice serves at least two
complimentary purposes, it punishes the party whose conduct
warrants dismissal, and it serves to deters others from engaging in

such conduct.161 There are no iron-clad rules regarding the
imposition of the sanction of dismissal, rather, dismissal should be
imposed when circumstances make it "just."' 62 While it is
recognized that dismissal for discovery violations is a drastic
penalty reserved only for extreme circumstances, 63 where there is

willfulness or bad faith,6 courts have not hesitated to impose them
reasoning that "discovery orders are meant to be followed., 165 This
is particularly true when a court employs less severe sanctions only
to observe the misconduct continue."6 A party's failure to comply
will not result in dismissal when there is a reason for
noncompliance, such as where the party demonstrates an effort to
resolve the discrepancies167

When parties are advised that continued recalcitrant behavior
will indeed lead to dismissal, courts are particularly apt to dismiss
actions. In Georgiadisv. FirstBoston Corp.,' 8 the court found that
1996), affd, 111 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1997).
159. Fujisankei Communications Intern., Inc v. Claxton, No. 97 Civ. 4324
(LMM), 1998 WL 428813 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1998).
160. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guiness,
456 U.S. 694, 707 (1982).
161. See Jones v. Thompson, 96 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1993). At least one court
has added a third reason - deterrent effect on the offending party in that particular
case. See Update Art, Inc. v. Modin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988).
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d); Williams v. National Housing Exchange, Inc.,
165 F.R.D. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The appropriateness of a given sanction is not
guided by any clearly defined rule or doctrine ... ").
163. See Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp.2d 879 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
164. See Valentine v. Museum of Modern Art, 29 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1994). But
see American Cash Card Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 184 F.R.D. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)("gross negligence may provide a basis for holding a noncompliant party in
default.").
165. Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 853 (2d Cir. 1995).
166. See Gratton v. Great American Communications, 178 F.3d 1373 (11th Cir.
1999) (dismissal warranted for spoilation, misidentification of witnesses, failure to
release records where less sanctions did not change the conduct).
167. See U.S. v. General Electric Co., 158 F.R.D. 161 (D. Or. 1994).
168. 167 F.R.D. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau
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since plaintiff was repeatedly cautioned that continued failure to
comply with discovery orders could lead to dismissal, the court's

interest in managing its docket outweighed plaintiff's interest in
being heard and dismissal was appropriate."'
D. Default

As with dismissal, violation of a court order is a prerequisite to
a default sanction.'70 Courts have held that default must be imposed
if Rule 37 is to be effective in both punishing and deterring severe
Examples of discovery abuse justifying default
misconduct."'
judgment include a party's repeated ignorance of orders to attend a
deposition, failure to produce documents and provide testimony,
deliberate destruction of records, 173 and repeated failure to comply
with discovery orders. 4

Entry of default judgment is appropriate for willful failure to
comply with discovery where the sought information is material to
the adverse party.'

Default sanction should be invoked only where

the misconduct was willful and a lesser sanction will not be
effective.

6

However, in the Second Circuit, gross negligence in

Intern., Inc., 111 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissal justified as party was warned that
noncompliance would result in dismissal).
169. See id. at 25.
170. See United States v. Certain Real Property Located at Route 1, Bryant,
Ala., 126 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1997).
171. See Downs v. Westphal, 78 F.3d 1252 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding default
judgement appropriate as misconduct was the result of bad faith); Malautea v.
Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming default against party
that willfully produced untrue responses to discovery motions); Starbrite
Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. AIM Const. & Contracting Corp., 164 F.R.D. 378, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
172. See Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849 (2d Cir. 1995)
(failure to produce documents a privilege log and witness's refusal to provide
answers meant defendant "rolled the dice on the district court's tolerance for
deliberate obstruction and they lost.").
173. See Communispond, Inc. v. Kelley, No. 96 Civ. 1487 (DC), 1999 WL 9854
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999).
174. See Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. MN EGASCO STAR, No. 94
Civ. 6813 (DC), 1996 WL 74745 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 104 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1996).
175. See E1-Yafi v. 360 East 72nd Owners Corp., 164 F.R.D. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
176. See Gonzalez v. Trinity Marine Group, Inc., 117 F.3d 894, 897-99 (5th Cir.
1997) (upholding finding that sanctions were warranted for fabricating evidence
but reversing dismissal sanction in absence of trial court finding that lesser
sanctions would not have ensured compliance); Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, 100
F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1996) (default sanction inappropriate as it should be invoked
only as a "last resort").
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complying with discovery orders, as opposed to willful conduct,
may provide a basis for holding a noncompliant party in default.'
In Communispond, Inc. v. Kelley,'78 the district court entered a
default judgment because the defendants failed to produce
documents after being ordered to do so repeatedly."9 Moreover,
the court found the defendant failed to conduct a diligent search
and failed to produce the pertinent documents."
The court
imposed the sanction for four reasons: (1) defendants had willfully
refused to comply with the order; (2) defendant had acted in bad
faith; (3) default was the only appropriate sanction available; and
(4) plaintiff had been "substantially prejudiced."'81
In Starbrite Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. AIM Const. &
Contracting Corp.,82 the court struck defendant's answer and
granted judgment by default.' 83 The court noted that defendant
"flouted their obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure" by ignoring discovery requests and deadlines despite
being warned of possible sanctions." The court further noted that
plaintiff had been substantially prejudiced and concluded that "it is
obvious that defendant's goal has been
to drag out this lawsuit to
' 85
put financial pressure on the plaintiff.'
In American Cash Card v. AT&T,' 86 the court considered the
following six factors in determining whether to impose a default
judgment: (1) willfulness; (2) history, if any, of noncompliance; (3)
appropriateness of lesser sanctions; (4) whether the noncompliant
had been warned of sanction; (5) the client's complicity, if any; and
(6) prejudice to the other party.'87
IX. Jurisdictional Comparison of Default and Dismissal Sanctions
The First, Second, Seventh, Eight and Eleventh Circuits have
not delineated a specific test for imposing litigation ending
177. See American Cash Card Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 184 F.R.D. 521, 524
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Even assuming that [plaintiff] did not act willfully, its failure to
comply with the Court's numerous discovery orders was at least grossly negligent,
and gross negligence may provide a basis for holding a noncompliant party in
default.").
178. 1999 WL 9854, at *1.
179. See id. at *1-2.
180. See id. at *2.
181. See id. at *2.
182. 164 F.R.D. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
183. See id. at 379.
184. See id. at 381.
185. See id. at 382.
186. 184 F.R.D. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
187. See id. at 524.
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sanctions. In contrast, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have articulated a set of standards that district courts
are to consider prior to invoking litigation-ending sanctions. While
these latter circuits employ standards, they vary widely. However,
some factors are universal: (1) willfulness or bad faith; (2) the
prejudice to the moving party; (3) the effect on general deterrence;
(4) the propriety of lesser sanctions; (5) whether the noncompliant
was warned; (6) history of misconduct; (7) whether the
noncompliance was due to counsel or the party; and (8) balancing
the competing interests of docket management and the preference
for hearing cases on the merits.
A. FirstCircuit

The First Circuit is particularly reluctant to deny parties the
right to have the case resolved on the merits. Pursuant to
Velasquez-Rivera v. Sea-Land Services, Inc.,1" litigation-ending

sanctions are "counter to its strong policy favoring the disposition
of cases on their merits.. .[such that] fairness requires that some
limits be placed on [the use of dismissal or default as a sanction]."'89
Some factors to be weighed include any history of misconduct,
prejudice to the movant, willfulness, and whether the client or
counsel is at fault." Moreover, while the First Circuit has indicated
that it will be deferential in its review of sanctions decisions, that
deference should not be taken as "automatic acquiescence......
B. Second Circuit

At least one district court in the Second Circuit has utilized the
following factors in determining the appropriateness of litigationending sanctions: (1) willfulness or bad faith; (2) the history of
noncompliance; (3) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (4) whether the
offender had been placed on notice of possible dismissal; (5) the
client's complicity; (6) prejudice to the adversary; and (7) the
competing interests of the court's docket control and the preference
for resolving issues on the merits.' 92 Yet another court narrowed
188. 920 F.2d 1072 (1st Cir. 1990).
189. Id. at 1075-76 (citations omitted).
190. See id. at 1076.
191. U.S. v. One 1987 BMW 325, 985 F.2d 655, 657 (1st Cir. 1993).
192. See American Cash Card v. AT&T, Corp., 184 F.R.D. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); see also A.I.A. Holding S.A. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 97 CIV. 4978 (LMM)
(RLE), 2000 WL 98315 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2000) (employing the first six factors in
evaluating whether dismissal is appropriate).
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the factors stating that sanctions should (1) insure a party does not
benefit from failure to comply, (2) deter further conduct by that
party in a particular case, and (3) deter others in that94 case and in
other cases.
C.

93

However there is no one particular test.

Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has adopted the following six part test, which

involves consideration of the: (1) extent of client's personal conduct; (2) prejudice to opposing counsel of the noncompliance; (3)
past conduct; (4) willfulness; (5) efficacy of lesser sanctions; and (6)
merits of the claim. 195
D. Fourth Circuit

The Fourth Circuit employs consideration of the following
factors: (1) presence of bad faith; (2) the prejudice to the adversary;

(3) the need to deter the particular
conduct involved; and (4) the
196
effectiveness of lesser sanctions.
E. Fifth Circuit

According to the Fifth Circuit, the following four part test
applies: (1) willfulness (or history of dilatory conduct); (2) client or
counsel misconduct; (3) prejudice to opposing party; and (4)

effectiveness of lesser sanctions.' 97

F.

Sixth Circuit

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit precedent, the following factors
determine whether ultimate sanctions are warranted: (1) prejudice;
(2) whether the noncompliant was warned of the potential for
dismissal or default; and (3) the efficacy of lesser sanctions. 9'
193. See New York Funeral Chapels, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 33 F. Supp.2d
294 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp.2d
879 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (with respect to the sanction of dismissal, the court held that
in addition to a finding of fault or bad faith, dismissal requires (1) serious prejudice
to the party seeking discovery and (2) that lesser sanctions would constitute
inadequate punishment and deterrence of future discovery violations.).
194. The Second Circuit has yet to resolve the various approaches.
195. See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1330 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995).
196. See Mutual Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Associates, Inc.,
872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989); Nutramax Laboratories, Inc. v. Twin Laboratories,
Inc., 32 F. Supp.2d 331, 338 (D. Md. 1999).
197. See F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1994).
198. See Beil v. Lakewood Engineering and Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir.
1994).
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However, in Bass v. Jostens, Inc.,1 9 the court found the following

factors relevant in ascertaining whether dismissal was a proper
sanction: (1) bad faith or willfulness; (2) the degree of prejudice to
opposing party; (3) whether the party was warned; and (4) the
efficacy of less drastic sanctions. °
The Sixth Circuit found in Freeland v. Amigo 1 that the trial
court abused its discretion in precluding expert testimony, which
resulted in dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. 20 The appellate court
found that the trial court's lack of notice to the parties that
noncompliance with the pre-trial order would result in preclusion,
coupled with the lack of prejudice to the defendant, mandated a
reversal of the dismissal. 3
G. Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit has affirmed numerous litigation-ending
sanction rulings.2" However, the Seventh Circuit also insists on a
court's delineation of the reasons for imposing sanctions and will
remand a dismissal sanction based upon the district court's failure
to explain the rationale for its ruling.0 5 While misconduct will be
sanctioned, some misconduct will not rise to a level warranting
sanction. In Stafford v. Mesnik, °6 the court ruled a party's absence
from a single meeting did not justify entering a default judgment.2 °
The court held that the failure to attend the meeting did not
constitute the "degree of egregiousness" necessary for the
litigation-ending sanction imposition.
H. Eighth Circuit
In Baker v. General Motors Corp.,209 the Eighth Circuit stated

that prior to imposing sanctions, there must be a willful violation of
a court order and prejudice arising from the violation so that the
199. 71 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995).
200. See id. at 241.
201. 103 F.3d 1271 (6th Cir. 1997).
202. See id. at 1281.
203. See id. at 1277-81.
204. See, e.g., Halas v. Consumer Services, Inc., 16 F.3d 161 (7th Cir. 1994).
205. See Matter of Scheri, 51 F.3d 71, 75 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that while
appellate courts need to afford the lower court with discretion, that did not
constitute an absence of review).
206. 63 F.3d 1445 (7th Cir. 1995).
207. See id. at 1451.
208. Id.
209. 86 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd and remanded, 522 U.S. 222 (1998),
vacated in part, 138 F.3d 1225 (8th Cir. 1998).
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sanction be "just., 210 Also, in Meints v. DeWitt,2" the court affirmed
dismissal against a pro se plaintiff who was warned about the
potential for sanctions for the willful failure to attend a
deposition.2
I.

Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit employs a five part test involving consideration of the following: (1) interest in expeditious resolution; (2)
need to manage the court docket; (3) interest of resolution on
merits; (4) prejudice; and (5) availability of lesser sanctions. 3 In
the case of In re Exxon Valdez,1 4 the Ninth Circuit stated that the
following factors are considered in reviewing a trial court's
dismissal sanction: (1) public interest in prompt resolution; (2)
court interest in docket management; (3) prejudice to the party; (4)
public interest in having cases decided on merits; and (5)
appropriateness of lesser sanctions.215 However, as a practical
matter, courts routinely require that the offending party acted
216
willfully or in bad faith before terminating a case.
J.

Tenth Circuit

In Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,2 7 the
Tenth Circuit stated that in evaluating whether to dismiss, the
district court ought to consider (1) the degree of actual prejudice to
the adversary, (2) the interference with the judicial process, (3) the
culpability of the offending party, (4) whether the party was
warned, and (5) the appropriateness of lesser sanctions. 8
K. Eleventh Circuit
In Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co.," 9 the Eleventh Circuit
210. Id.
211. 68 F.3d 478 (8th Cir. 1995).
212. See id.
213. See Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993).
214. 102 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1996). These factors apply equally to pro se litigants
as well. See Van Horn v. Motorola, Inc., No 98-15947, 1999 WL 311357 (9th Cir.
May 14, 1999).
215. See In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d at 432-33.
216. See, e.g., George v. City of Morro Bay, 185 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 1999) (claim
not dismissed because intentionally relinquish its rights under Section 365 (d)(4) of
the Bankruptcy Code).
217. 70 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 1995).
218. See id. at 1174.
219. 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 863 (1993).
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articulated three factors that district courts may22 consider in

evaluating litigation-ending sanctions: (1) while district courts have
discretion, severe sanctions require willfulness or bad faith; (2) the
sanction must satisfy due process considerations by being "just; and
(3) severe sanctions must be weighed against invoking less severe
sanctions.

221

L. Synthesis
As detailed above, there are numerous variations among the
Circuits.222 Except for the Ninth Circuit, all of the circuits that have
adopted a test require willfulness. Interestingly, some district
courts in the Second Circuit have allowed gross negligence to serve
as a prerequisite for the imposition of sanctions. Prejudice is a
crucial element, in fact "a key factor" in the Ninth Circuit.2
However, the Fifth Circuit holds the misconduct must substantially
prejudice the opposing party.224
The Tenth Circuit similarly
requires the court consider the degree of actual prejudice. 225
With respect to the effectiveness of other sanctions, no circuit
other the Ninth has explained the meaning of this factor. 26 Also,
while the Fifth Circuit has determined that dismissal is appropriate
only if lesser sanctions have failed,227 other circuits hold the
221
opposite.
The only circuit even indicating that general deterrence is a
factor is the Fourth.9 However, although in F.D.LC. v. Conner 0
general deterrence is referenced, the court does not explain it nor is
deterrence mentioned in other rulings.

220. In some rulings, the factors are not even mentioned. See BankAtlantic v.
Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 12 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 1994).
221. See Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1542.
222. Moreover, even within a particular circuit, sanctions are often applied in a
haphazard fashion. See Bough, supra note 5.
223. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993).
224. See Coane v. Ferrara Pan Candy Co., 898 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1990).
225. See Jones v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 261, 264 (10th Cir. 1993).
226. See Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1987).
227. See F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir. 1994).
228. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 132 (stating that while the feasibility of lesser
sanctions is desirable, there is no requirement that they be imposed prior to
dismissal) (citation omitted).
229. See Mutual Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Associates, Inc.,
872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989) ("In such cases, not only does the noncomplying
party jeopardize his or her adversary's case by such indifference, but to ignore such
bold challenges to the district court's power would encourage other litigants to flirt
with similar misconduct.").
230. 20 F.3d 1376, 1383 (5th Cir. 1994)
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With regard to prior conduct, only the Third Circuit requires
the district court to evaluate this factor.231 The Sixth and Tenth
Circuits require the district court to warn of possible dismissal prior
to imposition.232 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit disagrees. 233' The
Circuits are split regarding client versus counsel misconduct) 4
X.

Pro Se Litigants
Courts will not tolerate egregious behavior on the part of pro

se parties. In Valentine v. Museum of Modern Art,235 a pro se's
complaint was found to have been appropriately dismissed because

of the party's refusal to comply with court orders, although the
court noted that plaintiff was warned that continued conduct would

lead to dismissal. 36 In Van Horn v. Motorola, Inc.,237 the court held
that while pleadings of pro se litigants are construed liberally, "pro

se litigants are bound by rules of procedure., 238 However, in
Mooney v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation,239 the court granted a pro
se plaintiff an extension to file an expert report despite previous
warnings that further requests would not be granted. 24° The court

stated that it had not provided the pro se litigant with notice that a
further delay would result in a severe sanction.'

231. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).
232. Beil v. Lakewood Engineering and Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1994);
cf.U.S. v. A&P Arora, Ltd. 46 F.3d 1152 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion).
233. See F.D.LC., 20 F.3d at 1383 ("Like all court orders, discovery orders are
to be obeyed when issued, and sanctions for violating such orders may be imposed
without an explicit prior warning or a litany of precautionary instructions.").
234. See, e.g., Carter v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 804 F.2d 805, 808 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("We do not favor dismissal of a case when the attorney's
delinquencies -not the client's -necessitate sanctions."); Prince v. Poulos, 876
F.2d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1989) ("dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly
attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client .. ");Coleman v.
American Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1095 (6th Cir. 1994) ("we have increasingly
emphasized directly sanctioning the delinquent lawyer rather than an innocent
client.... ");Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1987)
(noting that dismissal does not unfairly punish client for misconduct of counsel).
235. 29 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1994).
236. See id. at 49.
237. 178 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1999).
238. Id.
239. 184 F.R.D. 588 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
240. See id.
241. See id. at 590.

2000]

RULE 37 DISCOVERY SANCTIONS

XI. Contempt
Rule 37 allows a district court to find a failure to comply with a
discovery order a contempt of court. 2 The goal of a contempt
sanction is to prod the recalcitrant party into providing discovery
and/or to compensate the other party. A court will impose a
contempt sanction when (1) the ignored order is clear and
unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear, and (3) the
party has not reasonably attempted to comply. 2 3 Contempt is
appropriate only when a party is in control of producing the
discovery.244 The party in noncompliance bears the burden of
demonstrating a lack of control.2 5 The amount of the fine should
not exceed the ability to pay, but large enough to coerce
compliance. 24 There may also be local rules which add conditions
and procedures. 7 In Fonar Corp. v. Magnetic Resonance Plus,
Inc.,2"8 the Second Circuit affirmed a contempt finding where
counsel failed to produce a client for depositions as directed. The
court noted counsel failed to inform the court of the client's alleged
unavailability and attempted to condition the deposition as a
prerequisite for producing his client.2 9 Consistent with other
aspects of Rule 37, there is a split of authority regarding whether a
district court can order fines pursuant to Rule 37 without finding a
party in contempt.25°
242. See FED R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) (failure to provide to provide testimony after
directed to do so by court); 37(b)(2)(D) (failure to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery). A court also has an inherent power to impose a contempt
sanction. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32. 43 (1991) ("Courts of justice
are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with the power
to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence and submission to their
lawful mandate."). However, regardless of whether a sanction is grounded on
Rule 37 or the court's inherent power, the same amount of due process must be
afforded. See Satcorp Int'l Group v. China Nat'l Silk Import & Export, Corp., 101
F.3d 3, 5 (2d Cir. 1996). Of course contempt in the court's presence can be
sanctioned "summarily" without a hearing. See International Union v. Bagwell,
512 U.S. 821 (1994).
243. See U.S. v. Local 1804-1 Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-C20, 44 F.3d
1091 (2d Cir. 1995).
244. See Brown v. JFH Mak Trucking, No. 95-CV-2118 JS, 1999 WL 1057274, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1999).
245. See Howe Laboratory v. Sterck, No. 94-CV-5013 (SJ), 1997 WL 340916, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 1997).
246. See King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 877 F. Supp. 185,190 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
247. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. R. 83.9(a).
248. 128 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997)
249. See id. at 103.
250. Compare Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1263 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Absent
contempt, the only monetary sanctions Rule 37 authorizes are 'reasonable
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XII. Expenses and Fees
Rule 37(a)(4)(A) provides that a prevailing party is entitled to
reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees involved in moving to
compel the disclosure unless the position of the losing party was
substantially justified. Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4), should a motion

to compel be granted, the court must award expenses, including
attorneys' fees, unless the movant failed to exert a good faith effort

to obtain the information without judicial intervention, or that the
nondisclosure was substantially justified or other circumstances
would result in an award being unjust." Should a court deny a
motion to compel disclosure, expenses (including attorneys' fees)
must be awarded unless the court finds the motion was substantially
justified or circumstances would make an award unjust.252 However,
a court may award expenses even in the absence of a good faith
effort to resolve if such effort would be futile.253
Under Rule 37(b)(2), monetary sanctions limited to reimbursement of expenses resulting from the failure to disclose may be

imposed.

However, these expenses must be limited to those

actually incurred.5

XIII. Attorneys' Fees

The district court may order a party, or counsel to that party,
or both, to compensate the other party for reasonable expenses
including attorneys' fees caused by the discovery misconduct.255
expenses' resulting from the failure to comply with discovery."), with JM
Clemmshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338, 355-56 (D. Conn. 1981)
("There is no indication in Rule 37 that this list of sanctions was intended to be
exhaustive. Indeed, the fact that Rule 37 also provides for the entry of such orders
'as are just' suggests that, under that rule, a court possesses the authority to fashion
any of a range of appropriate orders to enforce compliance with the of pre-trial
discovery" including "the imposition of a fine upon counsel [even in the absence of
contempt].").
251. See Shuffle Master, Inc. v Progressive Games, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 166, 170-73
(D. Nev. 1996) (stating that good-faith effort requires more than claim of efforts;
rather it must specifically recite measures undertaken to avoid motion practice).
252. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (a)(4)(B).
253. Note that a violation of local rules may include proof of a failure to make a
good faith attempt at resolution. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y.D. 3(f), requiring counsel to
attempt to resolve a discovery issue; see also Reidy v. Runyon, 169 F.R.D. 486,
490-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (determining that if good-faith effort would have been
futile, expenses can be awarded without such effort).
254. See Law. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1438, 1440-43
(10th Cir. 1998) (district court's 25% premium on award of expenses constituted a
criminal fine warranting reversal for failure to provide notice of potential criminal
penalties).
255. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (failure to comply with a discovery order);
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The fee request must be reasonable 256 and documented through
affidavits and supporting documentation.
While the usual fee
request is based upon being forced to move to compel, 258 costs
attendant to various other items are also recoverable.259 Moreover,

should a party refuse to admit the genuineness of a document or
acknowledge the truth of any matter and such document or matter
is subsequently proven, the court may upon motion, award the
expenses including attorneys' fees to the party who sought the

admission.
Attorneys'

bankruptcy

fees will

cases.2"

be awarded

when

appropriate

in

An improper motion for discovery sanctions

could result in an award of attorneys' fees against the movant. 6
Dilatory conduct will also subject the offender to a sanction of
attorneys' fees.262 Even if no order to produce is entered by the
court, where there are formal discovery orders, failure to produce

documents pursuant to appropriate request will result in the
sanction of attorneys' fees.263
A. SubstantialJustification

Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4)(A), the court must impose the
sanction unless the failure to comply was filed without a good faith
37(d) (failure of a party to appear for a deposition or respond to a request to
respond to interrogatories or inspection); 37(g) (failure to participate in good faith
pursuant to Rule 26(f) of a discovery plan). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994)
empowers the court to award costs and attorneys' fees against counsel who
unreasonably delays the proceedings.
256. See E.E.O.C. v. Accurate Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 828
(E.D. Wis. 1994).
257. See Carroll v. Jaques, 926 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Tex 1996), affd, 110 F.3d
290 (1997); Monaghan v. SZS 33 Associates, L.P., 154 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
258. See Sebring Homes Corp. v. T.R. Arnold & Associates, Inc., 927 F. Supp.
1098 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
259. See Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp, 161 F.R.D. 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that time spent on conferences recoverable); Zip Dee,
Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 949 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding costs attendant to
obtaining opinion letters recoverable).
260. See In re Rothery, 200 B.R. 644 (9th Cir. 1996)
261. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90
(D. Col. 1996).
262. See Lee v. Walters, 172 F.R.D. 421 (D. Or. 1997) (assistant state Attorney
General's dilatory tactics, failure to comply with discovery orders and past
contumacious conduct, required imposition of attorney's fees); Williams v. Morris,
956 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Va. 1996) (belated production of documents coupled with
failure to communicate with opposing counsel regarding the delay revealed a
disregard of discovery rules).
263. See Monaghan v. SZS 33 Associates, L.P., 154 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(attorney's fees appropriate in light of failure to offer any mitigating excuses).
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attempt to resolve, would lead to unjust results or was substantially
justified. Similar to other sanctions, if a party is "substantially
justified" in failing to disclose it will not be subject to attorneys'
fees sanction.2" For example, in Maddow v. Proctor& Gamble Co.,
Inc.,265 the court found plaintiffs were substantially justified in
refusing to provide discovery and therefore the sanction of
imposing obligation for an attorney fee was improper.2 6 In
Maddow, the court held that the plaintiffs justifiably relied upon
Supreme Court dictum with respect to the attorney fee issue and
case law from another circuit in the absence of in-circuit case law.267
The
court held such reliance
constituted
"substantial

justification."2' 6 Some courts use a four part test in determining
whether substantial justification exists.269

To promote goals of

sanction imposition and avoid the inconsistent application of
sanctions, between and within jurisdictions, the Supreme Court
should articulate the appropriate factors courts are to employ when
evaluating whether particular sanctions are appropriate.7

XIV. Conclusion
It is manifestly clear that despite the lack of Supreme Court
rulings over the last twenty-four years, there is a substantial amount

of discovery abuse that is commonplace in our federal courts.
Federal district courts have been grappling with resolving the

inherent tension between the need to keep an orderly flow of cases
as well as to punish and deter discovery abuse and the parties' need

for their "day in court."

However, without objective criteria

ordered by the Supreme Court, what has arisen is substantial

uncertainty with respect to what conduct warrants sanctions.'
264. See Caruso v. Coleman Co., 147 F.R.D. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
265. 107 F.3d 846 (11th Cir. 1997).
266. See id. at 853.
267. See id. The decision in which the court found the plaintiffs had placed
their reliance is Blanchardv. Bergeron, 487 U.S. 87 (1989). See id.
268. See id.
269. The test includes consideration of 1) the importance of withheld
information, 2) the reason for the failure to disclose, 3) prejudice, and 4)
availability of an adjournment to cure prejudice. See Trilogy Communication, Inc.
v. Times Fiber Communication, 109 F.3d 739, 744 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Citizens Bank
of Batesville v. Ford Motor, Co., 16 F.3d 965, 966 (8th Cir. 1994); Transclean Corp.
v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 77 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1063 (D. Minn. 1999).
270. Otherwise, "[u]ntil the [court] consistently applies [ ] a standard and
clearly sets forth the elements of a Rule 37 default or dismissal sanction, district
judges remain hopelessly impaired from controlling their courtrooms." Bough
supra note 5, at 55.
271. See Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. The Estate of Andy Warhol, 194 F.3d 323 (2d
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Some courts treat discovery misconduct strictly,2 72 others leniently.

73

The lack of national uniformity does little to promote the laudable
goals of sanction imposition.274 Courts and attorneys need clear
rules to follow to reduce the potential for inconsistent decisions.
Sanctions ought to be consistently applied if they are to advance the

goal of deterrence since haphazard sanctioning results in
uncertainty and thus encourages discovery abuse. 275 To advance the
arms of sanction imposition and avoid inconsistent application of
sanctions, both within and between jurisdictions, the Supreme
Court should articulate the appropriate factors courts are to employ
when evaluating whether particular sanctions are appropriate.276
In the absence of Supreme Court direction one possible
approach is for a district court to consider all eight of the universal

factors277 and not make any one factor absolutely necessary. This
would involve a balancing test of all factors and to the extent one or
more factors are lacking, more emphasis ought to be placed on

whether willfulness or prejudice exists. Such an approach is one
method to provide guidance and more certainty.

Cir. 1999) ("[D]etermining whether a case or conduct falls beyond the pale is
perhaps one of the most difficult and unenviable tasks for a court.").
272. See, e.g., American Cash Card Corp., v. AT&T Corp., 184 F.R.D. 521, 524
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that mere "gross negligence may provide a basis for
[severe sanctions].").
273. See, e.g., M & C Corp., v. Behr & Co., 34 F. Supp.2d 543 (E.D. Mich.
1999), wherein the court found that the offending party's conduct was
"deplorable" and that it had "been repeatedly warned that continued
contumacious conduct could result in drastic sanctions." Id. at 548. Yet, the court
denied a sanctions motion stating that "this court nonetheless finds it appropriate
to extend one final opportunity to [the party] to perform its discovery obligations."
Id. at 549.
274. See, e.g., Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 853 (2d Cir.
1995) ("[d]efendants rolled the dice on the district court's tolerance for deliberate
obstruction and they lost.").
275. See Susan A. Yager, Discovery Abuse: Have the 1983 Amendments to the
Federal Rule Curbed the Problem?, 37 FEDN. INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 399, 416
(1987) (stating that lack of standards encourages abuse).
276. Otherwise, "[u]ntil the [court] consistently applies [ ] a standard, and
clearly sets forth the elements of a Rule 37 default and dismissal sanction, district
judges remain hopelessly impaired from controlling their courtrooms." Bough,
supra note 5, at 55.
277. See supra Section IX.
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